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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This case involves a claim and subsequent lawsuit brought by Joseph Stanczak against
Appellants Edgar and Laurie Cook ("Cooks") claiming 1) premises liability and 2) negligent
supervision. Stanczak alleged he sustained gunshot-related injuries at the hand of Michael Jesse
Chisholm, the caretaker of recreational property owned by the Cooks and known as the Bloom
Lake Campground. In response to Stanczak's claims, the Cooks' insurance provider,
Respondent Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance ("Farm Bureau"), filed a separate declaratory
action against Stanczak and the Appellants. Farm Bureau then moved for summary judgment in
the declaratory action on the grounds that Stanczak's claims were not covered under the Cooks'
insurance policy with Farm Bureau, and therefore Farm Bureau had no duty to defend or
indemnify the Cooks in the Stanczak action. R pp. 8-171, 188-343.

B. Course of the Proceedings
On May 2, 2016, Farm Bureau filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment claiming a
lack of a duty to defend the Cooks against Stanczak's claims. R pp. 8-80. Farm Bureau
subsequently filed an Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment on June 3, 2016. R pp.
81-170. On August 10, 2016, the Cooks filed their Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and
Counterclaim, and Stanczak likewise filed his Answer to the Amended Complaint. R pp. 171181.
On August 18, 2016, Farm Bureau filed a Reply to Counterclaim and Demand for Jury
Trial. R pp. 182-187. The district court set a five-day jury trial to begin on January 23, 2018. R
p. 3.
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On October 20, 2016, Farm Bureau filed a Motion and Supporting Memorandum for
Summary Judgment, again declaring there was no coverage under the Cook's policy for
Stanczak's injuries because there was no "occurrence" under the liability policy, and that Farm
Bureau had no duty to defend or indemnify the Cooks. R pp. 188-242. Stanczak filed a Motion
to Strike portions of Farm Bureau's motion on October 21, 2016, because the motion for
summary judgment referenced a demand letter from Stanczak to Farm Bureau that was labeled
"for settlement purposes only." R pp. 344-353. Farm Bureau filed its response December 14,
2016. R pp. 370-375. A hearing on the motion to strike and Farm Bureau's motion for
summary judgment was scheduled for December 21, 2016. R. p. 4.
On December 9, 2016, the Cooks filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Farm Bureau's
Motion for Summary Judgment. R pp. 356-369. Stanczak likewise filed an opposition,
incorporating and joining the Cooks' arguments. R pp. 354-355. Farm Bureau filed a reply
memorandum on December 14, 2016. R pp. 376-398.
Following the December 21, 2016 hearing, the Honorable Barbara Buchanan entered a
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Plaintiff Farm Bureau's Motion for Summary
Judgment on January 20, 2017. R pp. 399-427. A final judgment was entered that same day. R
pp. 428-429. The judgment was amended on February 24, 2017. R pp. 433-434. The Cooks
filed a notice of appeal on March 2, 2017. R pp. 435-438.
C. Concise Statement of Facts

This case involves a shooting incident that occurred while Joseph Stanczak and his
girlfriend were camping on the Cooks' recreational property on June 28, 2015. R p. 165.
During the camping trip, Stanczak accepted Michael Jesse Chisholm's invitation to visit him at
the caretaker's cabin. Id During the visit, a verbal argument occurred. Id Stanczak then left the
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cabin to return to his campsite. Id. However, as Stanczak was walking towards his pickup with
his back toward the cabin, Michael Chisholm shot Stanczak in the upper left arm and back,
causing life-threatening injuries to Stanczak. Id.
Stanczak brought claims against the Cooks for premises liability and negligent
supervision. R pp. 166-68. The Cooks' insurer, Farm Bureau, denied a duty to defend the action
and provide liability coverage based on exclusions within the Cooks' insurance policy. R p. 85.
Following is the relevant information regarding the Cooks' property, their insurance policy, and
the pleadings involved in this appeal.
1.

The Cooks' Bloom Lake Property and Michael Chisholm

The Cooks own rural property in Bonner County, Idaho comprising 200 acres adjacent
to Bloom Lake. R p. 401. The property has a small cabin, and a campground located on it. Id.
The Cooks have owned this property, commonly known as Bloom Lake, for nearly 67 years,
and have allowed the public to camp there free of charge since the 1950s. Id. About 19 years
ago, Michael Jesse Chisholm requested the Cooks allow him to reside in the cabin in exchange
for caring for the property; the Cooks agreed. Id. The Cooks never paid Chisholm for his work
at their property, and considered him a volunteer who they allowed to live on their property. R
p. 402. Mr. Chisholm lived at the cabin until the June 28, 2015 shooting incident involving
Stanczak. R pp. 404-05. Chisholm was then arrested, executed an Alford plea, and was
sentenced to a unified term of imprisonment of ten years, with two years fixed and eight years
indeterminate. R pp. 405-407.

2.

The Cooks' Insurance Policy

The Cooks purchased a liability insurance policy from Farm Bureau which included
premises liability. See R pp. 16-66. The "Country Squire" policy ("Policy") has three separate
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coverage sections: Section I (Property), Section II (Liability), and Section III (Automobile),
and lists both "Edgar Wilkins Cook, Jr." and "Laurie Frances Cook" as the "insureds." R pp.
16-21. The relevant portions of the Policy are as follows:
Agreement

1.

We will provide the insurance described in this policy and the
Declarations if you have paid the premium and have complied with the
policy provisions and conditions ....
SECTION II LIABILITY INSURANCE

COVERAGE Fl BODILY INJURY LIABILITY . ...
If a claim is made or a suit is brought against any insured for damages because
of bodily injury or property damage, caused by an occurrence to which this
coverage applies, we will:

1.

Pay up to our limit of liability for the damages for which the
insured is legally liable (damages includes any awarded
prejudgment interest); and

2.

Provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our choice ....

R. pp. 22, 43 (emphasis in original).
The definitions portion of the Policy provides that the term "occurrence" means "an
accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to the same harmful conditions, which
results in unexpected bodily injury or property damage during the policy period." R. p. 24
(emphasis in original excluded). The term "accident" is not defined in the Policy. See R pp. 2225. If no exclusion exists which limits coverage, Farm Bureau is required under the Policy to
defend and indemnify its insureds under this broad scope of coverage. R pp. 22, 43.
3.

Stanczak's Claim and Farm Bureau's Declaratory Action

Besides claims against Chisholm, Stanczak asserted claims against the Cooks, namely
premises liability and negligent supervision. R pp. 295-300. In response to Stanczak's demand
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letter and this suit, Farm Bureau denied coverage on behalf of the Cooks, finding that no
"occurrence" took place under the Policy terms. Alternatively, Farm Bureau claimed even if
there was an occurrence, a policy exclusion precluded coverage. R pp. 68-77, 79-80, 142-51,
153-54, 156-61. Through a series of declaratory complaints and answers, Farm Bureau
maintained its argument that the Policy did not cover Stanczak' s claims against the Cooks. R
pp. 8-170, 182-87.
Farm Bureau filed its Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment on June 3, 2016,
stating its coverage position, followed by its Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting
pleadings. R pp. 81-170; 188-343. After the December 21, 2016 hearing on that motion, the
district court entered judgment for Farm Bureau. R pp. 428-429. The district court found there
was no "occurrence" as defined by the Policy. R pp. 399-427. The district court also held Idaho
case law precludes coverage of Stanczak's claims under the intentional act policy exclusion.
Id.. The district court entered an Amended Judgment on February 24, 2017. R pp. 430-34. The

Cooks filed a Notice of Appeal on March 2, 2017. R pp. 435-438.

II. ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Did the district court err by considering Chisholm's conduct in determining
whether the Cooks had policy coverage?

2.

Did the district court err in its interpretation and application of Idaho precedent
by failing to consider the Cooks' conduct when applying the definition of an
"occurrence" under the Policy?

3.

Did the district court err in ruling that Respondent Farm Bureau has no duty to
defend the Cooks in the Stanczak action?
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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Doe, 130 Idaho 693, 946 P.2d 1333 (1997), this
Court stated the standard of review for summary judgment:
When questions of law are presented, this Court exercises free review and is not
bound by findings of the district court, but is free to draw its own conclusions
from the evidence presented. Automobile Club Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 124 Idaho
874, 876, 865 P.2d 965, 967 (1993).
Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Bunker Hill Co. v.
United Steelworkers ofAmerica, 107 Idaho 155, 686 P.2d 835 (1984). A motion
for summary judgment must be denied if reasonable people could reach
differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the record of the
case. Cates v. Albertson's Inc., 126 Idaho 1030, 895 P.2d 1223 (1995). Upon
motion for summary judgment, all facts and inferences must be drawn in favor
of the nonmoving party. Perkins v. Highland Enters., Inc., 120 Idaho 511, 817
P.2d 177 (1991).

State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Doe, 130 Idaho 693,695, 946 P.2d 1333, 1335 (1997).

IV. ARGUMENT
A. Introduction
This case involves a liability coverage dispute based on the language of an insurance
policy. The Cooks purchased their Policy from Farm Bureau to protect them from premises
liability. In June of 2015, an event occurred. Michael Jesse Chisholm, who had been living on
and caring for the Cooks' Bloom Lake property, unexpectedly shot Joseph Stanczak, a visiting
camper, following an argument. Stanczak demanded that the Cooks compensate him for his
severe injuries under theories of premises liability and negligent supervision. Farm Bureau
denies it has a duty to defend and indemnify the Cooks against Stanczak's claims. Farm Bureau
asserts that the Policy language precludes the claims. Specifically at issue is whether there was
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an "occurrence" as defined by the Policy which would trigger policy coverage related to
Stanczak's claims against the Cooks.
The district court granted summary judgment to Farm Bureau m this matter on
alternative grounds, holding:
[T]he Court finds that there is no genuine dispute left for trial that Chisholm is
not an insured under the Policy, and because he is not an insured, he is not
entitled to Fl coverage under the Policy; and that, even if Chisholm was found
to be an insured under the Policy, there would be no coverage for Stanczak's
claims against the Cooks since Chisholm's commission of an intentional act
precludes Fl coverage because no "occurrence" occurred.
Rp. 411.
For the reasons set forth below, Stanczak claims this ruling was in error.
B. The district court erred in ruling that there was no coverage under the Policy for
Stanczak's claims against the Cooks.

As referenced above, the district court found the Cooks had no coverage in this matter
because Chisholm is not a named insured under the Policy. However, the claims at issue are
those brought by Stanczak against the Cooks, not the claims against Chisholm. It is the Cooks'
actions that must be considered to determine the existence of an "occurrence." The Cooks'
actions and the events that unfolded fall under this Court's definition of the term "accident" in
the applicable Idaho Supreme Court precedent, and thus the denial of coverage in favor of
Respondent Farm Bureau was an error.
1.

The district court improperly analyzed Chisholm's role as an "insured"
under the Policy.

Coverage Fl (Bodily Injury Liability) under the Policy provides coverage to an insured
"[i]f a claim is made or a suit is brought against any insured for damages because of bodily
injury or property damage, caused by an occurrence." R p. 43. Coverage Fl only applies to a
claim brought against an insured under the Policy.
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The district court found that there was no coverage under the Policy for Stanczak's
claims against the Cooks, emphasizing in its findings that Chisholm is not an "insured" and
alternatively, Chisholm's intentional acts clearly fall outside the scope of an "occurrence." R
pp. 411-413. This analysis was performed in error.
Whether Chisholm was an "insured" is irrelevant to the claims at issue in the
declaratory judgment. Stanczak' s premises liability claims and negligent supervision claims are
against the Cooks. As the district court noted, "[u]nder the Policy, an 'insured' is a person
named in the Policy Declarations or 'residents of your [the insured's] household, your spouse,
your relatives, and minors in the care of you or your relatives' .... The Policy Declarations list
only Edgar and Laurie Cook as insureds." R p. 411.
In the recent case of Fisher v. Garrison Property and Casualty Insurance Co., _
Idaho - - ' _

P.3d _

(Docket No. 44117-2016, issued May 26, 2017), this Court

reiterated:
"In construing an insurance policy, the Court must look to the plain
meaning of the words to determine if there are any ambiguities. This
determination is a question of law. In resolving this question of law, the Court
must construe the policy 'as a whole, not by an isolated phrase.'" Cascade Auto
Glass, Inc. v. Idaho Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 660, 663, 115 P.3d 751,
754 (2005) (citations omitted). "A provision in an insurance contract must be
read within the context in which it occurs." Dave's Inc. v. Linford, 153 Idaho
744, 751, 291 P.3d 427, 434 (2012). "Unless a contrary intent is shown,
common, non-technical words are given the meaning applied by laymen in daily
usage-as opposed to the meaning derived from legal usage-in order to effectuate
the intent of the parties." Howard v. Oregon Mut. Ins. Co., 137 Idaho 214, 218,
46 P.3d 510, 514 (2002). An exclusion in the policy must be strictly construed in
favor of the insured. Moss v. Mid-Am. Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 103 Idaho 298,
300,647 P.2d 754, 756 (1982).
Id.
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The district court erred in its analysis on the issue of who was an "insured." Stanczak
clearly made claims against the Cooks for their alleged actions. The clear language of the
Policy provides coverage for the Cooks and triggers a duty to defend.
2.

It is the Cooks' alleged conduct that determines whether an "occurrence"
existed.

The relevant portion of the Cooks' Policy guarantees coverage notwithstanding any
applicable exclusion, "[i]f a claim is made or a suit is brought against any insured for damages
because of bodily injury or property damage, caused by an occurrence." R p. 43. In this case, an
action was brought against the Cooks for damages because of Stanczak' s bodily injury caused
by an occurrence, thus indicating a duty of coverage under the Policy.
An "occurrence" is defined in the Policy as "an accident, including continuous or

repeated exposure to the same harmful conditions, which results in unexpected bodily injury or
property damage during the policy period." R p. 25. The term "accident" was left undefined.
However, in Mut. of Enumclaw v. Wilcox, 123 Idaho 4, 843 P.2d 154 (1992), this Court clearly
held that "not every word and phrase in an insurance contract needs to be defined in the
contract. Rather, insurance policies may contain words or phrases that simply have settled legal
meanings or interpretations." Id. at 8, 843 P.2d at 158. Further, the Wilcox court held that ''the
word 'accident' as used in an insurance policy ... and not otherwise defined in the policy, has
a settled legal meaning or interpretation." Id. at 9, 843 P.2d at 159. The Wilcox court adopted
the following definitions of the term "accident":
Accident.
Insurance contract. An accident within accident insurance policies is an
event happening without any human agency, or, if happening through
such agency, an event which, under circumstances, is unusual and
not expected by the person to whom it happens. A more
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comprehensive term than "negligence," and in its common signification
the word means an unexpected happening without intention or design.
Black's Law Dictionary 14 (5th ed. 1979).
ac • ci • dent (ak #si dent), n. I. an undesirable or unfortunate happening,
unintentionally caused and usually resulting in harm, injury, damage, or
loss; casualty; mishap: automobile accidents. 2. any event that happens
unexpectedly, without a deliberate plan or cause ....
Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary 9 (1989).

Wilcox, 123 Idaho at 9, 843 P.2d at 159 (emphasis added).
With this settled definition in mind, it is the conduct of the insured that is to be analyzed
when making the determination of whether or not an "accident," and therefore, an
"occurrence," took place. See Wilcox, 123 Idaho at 9, 843 P.2d at 159 (holding that the conduct
of the insured, Ms. Wilcox, must be looked to and not her ex-husband's conduct for the
purposes of insurance coverage); see also Fisher v. Garrison Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 162 Idaho
149, 395 P.3d 368 (2017), reh'g denied (May 25, 2017) (referencing district court's

Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Cross Motions for Summary Judgment as to Coverage
*8-9 (Feb. 25, 2016), wherein the court precluded summary judgment based on genuine issues
of material fact as to whether the intentional loss exclusion applied; the court looked to the
knowledge and actions of the insured to determine intent); see also Safeco Ins. Co. v. White,
122 Ohio St. 3d 562, 913 N.E.2d 426 (2009) (holding that whether or not an underlying act was
intentional must be determined from the perspective of the insured who is sued for negligent
supervision).
Ultimately, when properly analyzed under the rules of construction of an insurance
policy favoring coverage:
"The fact that an accident is caused by or is traceable to the act of a person other
than the insured does not prevent the occurrence from being an 'accident'.
APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF: 10

When the injury is not the result of the misconduct or the participation of the
in[s]ured party, it is, as to him, accidental although inflicted intentionally by the
other party."
Brumley v. Lee, 265 Kan. 810, 823, 963 P.2d 1224, 1232 (1998) (quoting 10 Couch on

Insurance 2d §41 :14 (1982)).
When viewed from the standpoint of the insured, assaults committed by third persons
are unexpected events constituting accidents and occurrences under insurance policies. See Lee
R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, Couch on Insurance § 127:21 (3d ed. 2012) ("[W]here the
insured is not the assailant but is instead liable based on . . . negligent supervision, or some
other negligence theory, the assault may constitute an accident or occurrence, at least from the
standpoint of the insured."); see also National Fire Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 898 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (D.
Ariz. 2012) (medical clinic's CGL "occurrence" policy triggered for sexual assault by
physician); Morris v. Coker, 923 F. Supp. 2d 863 (W.D. La. 2013) (employer's insurer
obligated to cover claim by consultant punched by employee).
In the present case, the district court erred by analyzing Chisholm's actions and
focusing on whether he acted intentionally when he shot and injured Stanczak. The Court first
decided if Chisholm were an insured, he would not have coverage under the Policy because the
intentional act exclusion would apply. R p. 411.
This analysis was incorrect. This case involves claims against the Cooks for their
actions. As set forth above, Chisholm's intent behind the act that caused Stanczak's injury is of
no consequence. There was no evidence before the district court that the Cooks intended to
negligently supervise Chisholm or take any other action that contributed to Stanczak's injury.
In application of the Wilcox definition of "accident" to the present facts, Chisholm's
shooting of Stanczak was "an event which, under circumstances, is unusual [to the insured
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Cooks] and not expected by [Stanczak] .... " Wilcox, 123 Idaho at 9, 843 P.2d at 159. The
shooting was "an unexpected happening without intention or design [by the Cooks]." Id. It was
"an undesirable or unfortunate happening, unintentionally caused [by the Cooks] and . . .
resulting in harm, injury, damage, [and] loss . . . ." Id. It was an "event that happen[ed]
unexpectedly, without a deliberate plan or cause [by the Cooks] ...." Id. The shooting of
Stanczak was therefore an "accident" as related to the insured Cooks, and thus an "occurrence"
qualifying for coverage under the Policy. The district court erred in finding otherwise.

3.

The district court erred in its interpretation and application of Idaho case
law.

The district court relied on two Idaho Supreme Court cases in its decision, 1 and held
that Idaho case law precludes coverage of Stanczak's claims against the Cooks. R pp. 413-423.
This holding misapplied the cited law.
The primary case relied on by the district court was Mutual of Enumclaw v. Wilcox, 123
Idaho 4, 843 P.2d 154 (1992). In Wilcox, twelve anonymous plaintiffs filed suit against Shirley
Wilcox ("Shirley"), her ex-husband ("Jay"), the State of Idaho, and ten unnamed employees of
the State regarding child sexual abuse perpetrated by Jay. Id. at 4-5, 843 P.2d at 154-55. The
issue before the Wilcox court was whether the claim against Shirley for negligent failure to
warn proper authorities met the definition of "an occurrence" under the applicable insurance
policies. Id. at 8, 843 P.2d at 158. The term "occurrence" was defined in both policies as "an
accident . . . ," but the term "accident" was undefined, thus compelling the Wilcox court to
establish whether the term "accident" "has a settled legal meaning or interpretation."2 Id. at 8-9,
843 P.2d at 158-59. The court stated:

1 Mutual ofEnumclaw v. Wilcox, 123 Idaho 4, 843 P.2d 154 (1992), and State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Doe, 130
Idaho 693, 946 P.2d 1333 (1997).
2 The Wilcox court's adopted definition of the term "accident" is presented in Section B.2 supra.
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With this definition in mind, we turn to the alleged acts of Wilcox. It is her
conduct that we must look to, and not to her ex-husband's conduct, because
she is the only one whose acts could be covered by the policy in question.
The twelve anonymous plaintiffs in the underlying action have alleged that
Wilcox was negligent in failing to report or warn the proper authorities of the
child molestation perpetrated upon minors by her ex-husband. Her alleged
conduct is the failing to report or warn, while her ex-husband's conduct is the
child molestation, which is intentional conduct and, thus, clearly not an
"occurrence."
Looking to Wilcox's alleged conduct, we find that it is not an "occurrence"
under the policies because it was not the conduct which caused injury. The
injury suffered by the minors is child molestation. While the acts or failure to
act by Wilcox may have created or contributed to the environment which
permitted her ex-husband's conduct, Wilcox did not commit the acts complained
of by the twelve anonymous plaintiffs. Therefore, the Enumclaw Policy and the
Wilcox Policy do not provide coverage for Wilcox.
Wilcox, 123 Idaho at 9, 843 P.2d at 159 (emphasis added).

The factual scenario leading to the decision in Wilcox is significantly different than the
present case. In Wilcox, the respective acts of child molestation and failure to report were each
done by individuals who could be classified as "insureds" under the applicable policies, namely
Shirley and her husband, Jay. Furthermore, Shirley's conscious decision not to report Jay's
continued abuse of children in the couple's care was clearly intentional, thus making her
actions not an "occurrence."
In contrast, Chisholm here was clearly not an "insured" under the Farm Bureau policy,
and as noted in Section B.1 above the court must look to the conduct of the insured in
analyzing coverage under an insurance policy. Unlike the conduct of Shirley in Wilcox, the
Cooks' conduct here was not an intentional act.
In reviewing the district court's memorandum decision in the present case, it appears
that ambiguous language in the Wilcox decision created confusion for the district court. The
Wilcox court began by referring to the definition of the term "accident," making it clear that it
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was the conduct of Shirley that was to be reviewed (and not Jay's intentional conduct) when
applying that definition. Wilcox, 123 Idaho at 9, 843 P.2d at 159. The referenced definition
clearly indicates that an "accident" is "unintentionally caused" and is "an event which, under
circumstances, is unusual and not expected by the person to whom it happens." Id With this in
mind, the Wilcox court then detailed the alleged conduct of both Shirley and Jay, making a
determination that Jay's conduct was intentional and therefore not an "occurrence." Id The
confusion created by the Wilcox court begins here, because instead of applying this analysis
and concluding that Shirley's conduct in failing to report to the proper authorities was
intentional (and therefore not an "occurrence"), the Wilcox court abruptly switched paths and
suddenly focused on the "conduct which caused injury," inevitably coming to the conclusion
that no "occurrence" existed because Jay's abuse of the children was intentional. Id
As quoted above, the Wilcox court stated, "Looking to Wilcox's alleged conduct we
find that it is not an 'occurrence' under the policies because it was not the conduct which
caused injury.... Wilcox did not commit the acts complained of by the twelve anonymous
plaintiffs." Wilcox, 123 Idaho at 9, 843 P.2d at 159. Yet nowhere in the Wilcox court's applied
definition of "accident" or the applicable insurance policies' definitions of "occurrence" is
there a focus on the "cause of the injury." Id The focus in the definitions of "accident" adopted
by the Wilcox court is the intent behind the act of the insured, and the unexpected nature of the
act. See id To further the confusion, the Wilcox court states that Shirley did not commit the acts
complained of by the twelve anonymous plaintiffs; but in fact, Shirley did commit the act of
failing to report, which was complained ofby the plaintiffs. Id at 5, 843 P.2d at 155. It was this
ambiguous line of analysis coupled with the above-noted factual differences that apparently
confused the district court in the case at hand, leading to an error of application of the law. This
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Court is requested in this appeal to correct and clarify the ambiguous reasoning of the Wilcox
court.
Also, in Wilcox, both Shirley and Jay were "insureds" under the policies, and thus the
respective actions of each would initially be looked to for coverage. By contrast, Chisholm here
was not a named "insured" or even an implied insured, and so it is solely the actions of the
Cooks (as insureds) that are at issue regarding coverage. And, not only were the Cooks' actions
not intentional (unlike Shirley Wilcox's actions in not reporting her husband to the authorities),
but the Cooks' negligence also partially caused Stanczak's injuries. Unlike the failure to report
by Wilcox, which could have only possibly "created or contributed to the environment" of the
ongoing sexual abuse, Id at 9, 843 P.2d at 159, the Cooks' negligent acts as alleged by
Stanczak led to the events of the shooting and the injuries to Stanczak. But for their actions in
failing to inspect their publicly-used premises and supervise Mr. Chisholm, Chisholm would
never have been in a position to shoot Stanczak in the first place.
If the Wilcox court's paragraph3 regarding the conduct that caused injury (cited above)

were viewed as dictum and removed from that decision, the outcome would have been the
same; there was no "occurrence" due to the intentional nature of Shirley's actions, and there
was no "occurrence" because the person causing the alleged injuries was another insured, Jay.
Wilcox, 123 Idaho at 9, 843 P.2d at 159. Yet the case at hand is different. Looking to the intent
behind the Cooks' actions creates a clear "occurrence" under the Policy because the Cooks'
actions were not intentional, and were thus "an accident" under the Wilcox definition. See
Wilcox, 123 Idaho at 9, 843 P.2d at 159. Unfortunately, the district court here looked to the
cause of injury in relation to the acts of Chisholm, a non-insured third-party, and concluded that

3

The second-to-last full paragraph of the Wilcox decision.
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his actions were intentional and thus there was no "occurrence." This is clearly an erroneous
interpretation and application of the Wilcox analysis.
Not long after deciding Wilcox, the Idaho Supreme Court yet again tackled the issue of
whether there was an "occurrence" creating liability under relevant insurance policies in State

Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Doe, 130 Idaho 693, 946 P.2d 1333 (1997). In Doe, the Doe
defendants operated a day care from their residence. The Roes' young daughter attended this
day care service and the Does' thirteen-year-old son engaged in inappropriate sexual conduct
with her. Id. at 693-94, 946 P.2d at 1333-34. The Roes brought suit against the Does alleging
multiple legal theories due to the Does' association with the sexual abuse perpetrated by their
son. Id. at 694, 946 P.2d at 1334. The Doe court reviewed the district court's ruling on whether
there was an "occurrence" under the applicable insurance policy which created a duty on the
Does' insurer to defend and cover the Does' acts of negligence and failure to report. Id. at 695696, 946 P.2d at 1335-36.
In its decision, this Court cited Wilcox, applying the definition of "accident" adopted
therein and noting the following Wilcox statement: "Ms. Wilcox's failure to report or warn the
proper authorities of the child molestation perpetrated upon minors by her ex-husband was 'not
an "occurrence" under the policies because it was not the conduct which caused injury."' State

Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Doe, 130 Idaho 693, 696, 946 P.2d 1333, 1336 (quoting Wilcox, 123
Idaho at 9, 843 P.2d at 159). The court then analyzed the facts of Doe as follows:
The facts in this case clearly show that the abuser understood the sexual nature
of his conduct as well as its wrongfulness. He threatened the child by telling her
that a "green monster" would get her if she told anyone of his behavior. The
conduct occurred in the downstairs bathroom of the residence in a location
where his conduct would not easily be detected. The Does' son's conduct was
not "without intention or design." Wilcox, 123 Idaho at 9, 843 P.2d at 159. An
accident is an unexpected event which is the result of unintentional conduct or
an intentional act which results in unexpected consequences. The district court
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found the facts established "intentional acts of sexual abuse." There is no other
reasonable interpretation of the facts. This intentional conduct, with
consequences that could be expected, cannot be characterized as an
accident. Therefore, there was no "occurrence" within the meaning of the
policy.
Doe, 130 Idaho at 695-696, 946 P.2d at 1335-36 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). It is

noteworthy that the Doe court never discusses the actions of the parent Does, but only
discussed the actions of the minor perpetrator.
The factual differences of Doe, in comparison to the case at hand, are the same as with
Wilcox. In Doe, the Does' son, who intentionally committed the acts of sexual abuse, would

clearly be an "insured" under the applicable insurance policies, just like the ex-husband would
be in Wilcox. The acts causing the harm were not perpetrated by a non-insured third-party, but
rather by someone who was an immediate family member of the named insured. Because of
this significant difference, based on the given definition of the term "accident" and this Court's
analysis in Wilcox, it is only logical that in a scenario involving a non-insured third-party such
as here, the Court should look to the intent and unexpected outcome of the event from the view
of the "insured," separate from the actions of the third-party.
These two Idaho Supreme Court decisions upon which the district court relied both
involve two insured parties; one that committed the intentional act that caused harm, and the
named party who did not commit the intentional act. The two cases also both involve acts of
sexual abuse committed by a family member where the involvement of the person being sued
(Ms. Wilcox and the parent Does) were not a direct cause of the injury. In fact, the Doe court
does not even discuss the actions of the parent Does, but focuses only on the intentional acts of
the perpetrator son. The facts of the case at hand are distinguishable from those in the precedent
relied upon by the district court.
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4.

Other appellate courts have decided similar fact patterns differently from
the district court here.

To further distinguish the difference between the Wilcox and Doe cases and the case at
bar, it is helpful to look to and compare other court decisions. Similar to State Farm v. Doe, in
Offeaus v. Guthrie, 140 Ohio App. 3d 90, 746 N.E.2d 685 (2000), parents were sued for their
involvement in their child's intentional actions causing injury. Id. at 91, 746 N.E.2d at 686.
Specifically, the parents were sued for negligence in giving their juvenile child access to a gun
when he subsequently murdered a neighbor with it. Id. at 92-93, 746 N.E.2d at 687. Focusing
on the acts of the child, the Offeaus court noted that there is no duty to defend or indemnify
when "the acts of the insured [parents] were intentional." Id. at 94, 746 N.E.2d at 698 (citing
Noftz v. Ernsberger, 125 Ohio App. 3d 376,382, 708 N.E.2d 760, 764 (1998)).
Comparatively, when faced with similar circumstances to the case at hand, where there
1s an intentional act by a non-insured third-party that causes injury paired with the
unintentional, negligent conduct of an "insured" party, courts generally separate the different
individual actions and analyze the claims specifically against the "insured" when determining
coverage. For example, in Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Pipher, 140 F.3d 222 (3rd Cir.
1998), a property owner's insurer argued that there could be no "occurrence," and thus no duty
to defend or indemnify the insured, when a painter hired by the insured murdered a tenant at the
building. Id. at 223-24. The underlying claims against the property owner included premises
liability and negligent hiring. Id. at 226. The Pipher court stated:
Although [the tenant's] death was the direct result of a third party's intentional
conduct, the complaint alleges that the insured's own negligence also played a
significant part in her death.... "[T]he fact that the event causing [bodily injury
or damage to property] may be traceable to an intentional act of a third party
does not preclude the occurrence from being an 'accident.'"
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Id at 225 (quoting Mohn v. American Cas. Co. of Reading, 458 Pa. 576, 326 A.2d 346, 348
(1974)). The Pipher court noted that from the insured's standpoint, the assault resulting in death
was "unexpected, entirely fortuitous, and, therefore, an accident." Pipher, 140 F.3d at 226; see

also Westfield Ins. Co. v. Tech Dry, Inc., 336 F.3d 503 (6th Cir. 2003) (insured's negligent
hiring and retaining of former employee who murdered customer was a qualifying "occurrence"
under the policy; the court found that the insured's conduct and actions must be evaluated, not
those of the perpetrator of the intentional act).
Like the facts of Pipher, in this case a non-insured third-party, Mr. Chisholm,
intentionally injured Stanczak on the insureds' property, and Stanczak subsequently alleged
that the insureds' own negligence played a significant part in his injury under theories of
premises liability and negligent supervision. Therefore, when viewed from the standpoint of the
Cooks as insureds, the injury they caused and the claims against them would not be precluded
by the Policy if the Cooks' actions amounted to an "accident."
The district court erred when it held that Idaho case law precludes coverage of
Stanczak's claims against the Cooks. There are clear factual differences in this case, because
the act of shooting was done by a third-party who was not an "insured," and the claims against
the Cooks alleged that their own negligent acts played a significant part in Stanczak' s injuries.
In light of these distinct differences and the apparent confusion caused by the pattern of
analysis in the Wilcox and Doe cases, this Court should reverse the district court's decision and
properly look to the injury from the viewpoint of the Cooks when determining if an "accident"
occurred.
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5.

From the standpoint of the insured, the events leading to Stanczak's
injuries fall under this Court's definition of an "accident"; therefore an
"occurrence" existed, triggering coverage for Stanczak's claims against the
Cooks.

When the facts of this case are correctly applied to the Court's adopted definition of
"accident," it is evident that an "accident" existed here. Summarized from Wilcox, an
"accident" is "an event which, under circumstances, is unusual and not expected by the person
to whom it happens" and is "an undesirable or unfortunate happening, unintentionally caused
and usually resulting in harm, injury, damage, or loss ...." See Wilcox, 123 Idaho at 9, 843
P.2d at 159.
As shown in Section B.2 above, in applying this definition, the events of this case
plainly qualify as an "accident;" "an event ... not expected by the person to whom it happens."
When Stanczak visited the Cooks' property to camp and was invited to their cabin by Mr.
Chisholm, Stanczak was not expecting to be shot. The event was completely unexpected by the
person to whom it happened.
Furthermore, when properly viewed from the standpoint of the insured, the injury to
Stanczak was clearly "unintentionally caused." See generally Wilcox, 123 Idaho 4, 843 P.2d
154 (1992); Fisher v. Garrison Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 162 Idaho 149, 395 P.3d 368 (2017),
reh'g denied (May 25, 2017); Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Pipher, 140 F.3d 222 (3rd

Cir. 1998). The Cooks did not intend through their actions for Stanczak to become injured, but
that is exactly what happened due to the Cooks' negligence. Without their actions of agreeing
to allow Chisholm to stay on their property and negligently failing to supervise him and inspect
the premises for dangers, the injuries would not have occurred. The Cooks certainly did not
intend to cause Stanczak's injuries; their actions were unintentional. The events of Stanczak's
injuries were therefore "an undesirable or unfortunate happening, unintentionally caused."
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Correctly applying the facts to the "settled legal meaning and interpretation" of an
"accident" illustrates that there was an "accident" in this case and therefore an "occurrence,"
thus triggering coverage under Section II of the Cooks' Policy. Even if this Court does not fmd
enough factual evidence on this matter to hold that the Cooks' actions were unintentional, in
light of the above, there are enough genuine issues of material fact to preclude summary
judgment as to whether or not an "accident" occurred.
C. The district court erroneously granted summary judgment on Farm Bureau's
claim for declaratory judgment.

This Court should reverse the district court's decision of summary judgment in favor of
the Respondent. In light of the terms of the Policy and the correct application of Idaho case
law, Farm Bureau has a duty to defend the Cooks and there remains a question of fact whether
there is coverage for the Cooks for the claims against them.
Incorrectly looking to whether Chisholm was an "insured" and applying his actions to
the definition of an "accident" produced an incorrect outcome in this case. The negligent
conduct of the Cooks was the cause of the alleged injuries, and their conduct should be
reviewed separate and apart from the acts of Chisholm, as the Cooks are the "insureds." When
correctly applying the issue at hand from the standpoint of the insured, it is clear there was an
"accident" and therefore an "occurrence" that would trigger liability under Section II of the
Policy.
Based on these facts, liberally construing all facts and drawing all reasonable inferences
in favor of the Cooks, it is apparent that the district court erred in finding "no genuine dispute"
on Farm Bureau's liability. This Court should therefore reverse the decision of summary
judgment and remand for further proceedings.
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D. Public policy dictates that Farm Bureau provide liability coverage for the Cooks'
negligence.
A major reason that individuals like the Cooks purchase liability insurance coverage for
property they own is to protect them from liability exposure in the event someone is injured on
the property due to the insured's negligence. Insureds do not draft the insurance policies for
which they pay premiums, and the typical insured is not trained in insurance law and is not an
expert in contract interpretation. When a situation such as the Stanczak shooting arises due to
the negligence of the insureds, it is reasonable for the insureds to expect that the liability
coverage for which they have been paying will apply, especially when the policy drafted by the
insurer does not explicitly exempt coverage based on the actions of a non-insured third-party.
As this Court observed in Moss v. Mid-Am. Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 103 Idaho 298, 64 7 P .2d
754 (1982):
This Court has long recognized that insurance policies are contracts of adhesion,
not subject to negotiation between the parties, and hence must be construed
most strongly against the insurer. Abbie Uriguen Olds. Buick, Inc. v. United
States Fire Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 501, 511 P.2d 783 (1973); Stephens v. New
Hampshire Ins. Co., 92 Idaho 537, 447 P.2d 14 (1968); Scharbach v.
Continental Cas. Co., 83 Idaho 589,366 P.2d 826 (1961); Rollefson v. Lutheran
Brotherhood, 64 Idaho 331, 132 P.2d 758 (1942). The provision at issue today
is one which seeks to exclude the insurer's coverage. Such an exclusion
must be strictly construed in favor of the insured. Hahn v. Alaska Title
Guaranty Co., 557 P.2d 143 (Alaska, 1976); Mission Ins. Co. v. Nethers, 119
Ariz. 405, 581 P.2d 250 (Ariz.App.1978); State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Partridge, 10 Cal.3d 94, 109 Cal.Rptr. 811, 514 P.2d 123 (1973); Northwestern
Nat. Ins. Co. v. Phalen, 597 P.2d 720 (Mont.1979); Conner v. Transamerica Ins.
Co., 496 P.2d 770 (Okl.1972); McDonald Industries, Inc. v. Rollins Leasing
Corp., 26 Wash.App. 376, 613 P.2d 800 (1980). See also Bonner County v.
Panhandle Rodeo Ass'n Inc., 101 Idaho 772, 620 P.2d 1102 (1980); Farmers
Ins. Group v. Sessions, 100 Idaho 914, 607 P.2d 422 (1980). Hence, the courts
have held that the burden is on the insurer to use clear and precise
language if it wishes to restrict the scope of its coverage. Goforth v. Franklin
Life Ins. Co., 202 Kan. 413, 449 P.2d 477 (1969); Anderson v. Nationwide Life
Ins. Co., 6 Kan.App.2d 163, 627 P.2d 344 (1981); Harvey's Wagon Wheel, Inc.
v. MacSween, 96 Nev. 215,606 P.2d 1095 (1980).
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Moss v. Mid-Am. Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 103 Idaho 298,300,647 P.2d 754, 756 (1982)

(emphasis added).
To hold that there is no coverage under the Policy for Stanczak's claims against the
Cooks would in essence expose all insured citizens of Idaho to personal liability under similar
circumstances, contrary to the insureds' understanding regarding the liability coverage for
which they pay. Such a decision would allow Farm Bureau and insurance companies like it to
benefit financially from the policies they draft at their insureds' expense. Public policy
therefore dictates that Farm Bureau cover the claims asserted by Stanczak under the Cooks'
Policy, especially given that Stanczak's injuries stem from an "occurrence" and "accident"
with respect to the negligent actions of the insureds, the Cooks.

V. CONCLUSION
Based upon the argument presented herein, the trial court's grant of summary judgment
should be reversed. The Cooks are insureds under the Policy. Further, the alleged negligence
falls under the definition of an "accident" and therefore an "occurrence" under the Policy,
requiring that Farm Bureau defend the Cooks against and provide coverage for Stanczak's
claims.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20th day of July, 2017.

JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.

WESS. LARSEN
Attorney for Appellants/Defendants
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